‘Nash eXchange’ directory
An incentive-compatible ‘deposit-refund’ mechanism for enabling trade without trusted third parties is the exploding Nash equilibrium where both parties put up 100% of the value in an ‘exploding box’, and if either is unhappy, the value is destroyed. Thus, neither party gains from scamming the other, and so will cooperate honestly.
This can be implemented as ‘2-of-2’ multisig escrow in Bitcoin & was popularized by the NashX website, and proposed for darknet market use.
See Also
-
Links
- “Payment Schemes from Limited Information With Applications in Distributed Computing ”, Schwartzbach 2022
- “The Exploding Nash 2-Of-2 NashX Equilibrium ”, Gwern 2021
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“When Hindsight Isn’t 20/
20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation ”, Wentsworth 2020 - “Optimal Smart Contracts With Costly Verification ”, Mamageishvili & Schlegel 2020
- “Blockchain-Based Solution for Proof of Delivery of Physical Assets ”, Hasan & Salah 2018
- “Solving the Buyer and Seller’s Dilemma: A Dual-Deposit Escrow Smart Contract for Provably Cheat-Proof Delivery and Payment for a Digital Good without a Trusted Mediator ”, Asgaonkar & Krishnamachari 2018
- “KopperCoin—A Distributed File Storage With Financial Incentives ”, Kopp et al 2016
- “Validation of Decentralised Smart Contracts Through Game Theory and Formal Methods ”, Bigi et al 2015
- “Two Party Double Deposit Trustless Escrow in Cryptographic Networks and Bitcoin [BitHalo] ”, Zimbeck 2014
- “Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms ”, Witkowski et al 2011
- “Double Deposit Escrow ”
- “Bithalo ”
- “Multi-Signature ”
- “All Pay Liability ”
- Wikipedia
- Miscellaneous
- Bibliography
Links
“Payment Schemes from Limited Information With Applications in Distributed Computing ”, Schwartzbach 2022
Payment Schemes from Limited Information with Applications in Distributed Computing
“The Exploding Nash 2-Of-2 NashX Equilibrium ”, Gwern 2021
“When Hindsight Isn’t 20/20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation ”, Wentsworth 2020
When Hindsight Isn’t 20/
“Optimal Smart Contracts With Costly Verification ”, Mamageishvili & Schlegel 2020
“Blockchain-Based Solution for Proof of Delivery of Physical Assets ”, Hasan & Salah 2018
Blockchain-Based Solution for Proof of Delivery of Physical Assets
“Solving the Buyer and Seller’s Dilemma: A Dual-Deposit Escrow Smart Contract for Provably Cheat-Proof Delivery and Payment for a Digital Good without a Trusted Mediator ”, Asgaonkar & Krishnamachari 2018
“KopperCoin—A Distributed File Storage With Financial Incentives ”, Kopp et al 2016
KopperCoin—A Distributed File Storage with Financial Incentives
“Validation of Decentralised Smart Contracts Through Game Theory and Formal Methods ”, Bigi et al 2015
Validation of Decentralised Smart Contracts Through Game Theory and Formal Methods
“Two Party Double Deposit Trustless Escrow in Cryptographic Networks and Bitcoin [BitHalo] ”, Zimbeck 2014
Two Party double deposit trustless escrow in cryptographic networks and Bitcoin [BitHalo]
“Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms ”, Witkowski et al 2011
“Double Deposit Escrow ”
“Bithalo ”
Bithalo
“Multi-Signature ”
“All Pay Liability ”
Wikipedia
Miscellaneous
Bibliography
2022-schwartzbach.pdf: “Payment Schemes from Limited Information With Applications in Distributed Computing ”,