- See Also
-
Links
- “Payment Schemes from Limited Information With Applications in Distributed Computing”, 2022
- “When Hindsight Isn’t 20/20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation”, 2020
- “Optimal Smart Contracts With Costly Verification”, 2020
- “Blockchain-Based Solution for Proof of Delivery of Physical Assets”, 2018
- “Solving the Buyer and Seller’s Dilemma: A Dual-Deposit Escrow Smart Contract for Provably Cheat-Proof Delivery and Payment for a Digital Good without a Trusted Mediator”, 2018
- “KopperCoin—A Distributed File Storage With Financial Incentives”, Et Al 2016
- “Validation of Decentralised Smart Contracts Through Game Theory and Formal Methods”, Et Al 2015
- “Two Party Double Deposit Trustless Escrow in Cryptographic Networks and Bitcoin [BitHalo]”, 2014
- “Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms”, Et Al 2011
- Wikipedia
- Miscellaneous
- Link Bibliography
An incentive-compatible ‘deposit-refund’ mechanism for enabling trade without trusted third parties is the ‘exploding Nash equilibrium’ where both parties put up 100% of the value in an ‘exploding box’, and if either is unhappy, the value is destroyed. Neither party gains from scamming the other.
This can be implemented as ‘2-of-2’ multisig escrow in Bitcoin & was popularized by the NashX website, and proposed for darknet market use.
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See Also
Links
“Payment Schemes from Limited Information With Applications in Distributed Computing”, 2022
“Payment Schemes from Limited Information with Applications in Distributed Computing”, 2022-07-13 (similar; bibliography)
“When Hindsight Isn’t 20/20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation”, 2020
“When Hindsight Isn’t 20/20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation”, 2020-11-08 (; backlinks; similar)
“Optimal Smart Contracts With Costly Verification”, 2020
“Optimal Smart Contracts with Costly Verification”, 2020-05-06 (; similar)
“Blockchain-Based Solution for Proof of Delivery of Physical Assets”, 2018
“Blockchain-Based Solution for Proof of Delivery of Physical Assets”, 2018-06-22 (; similar)
“Solving the Buyer and Seller’s Dilemma: A Dual-Deposit Escrow Smart Contract for Provably Cheat-Proof Delivery and Payment for a Digital Good without a Trusted Mediator”, 2018
“Solving the Buyer and Seller’s Dilemma: A Dual-Deposit Escrow Smart Contract for Provably Cheat-Proof Delivery and Payment for a Digital Good without a Trusted Mediator”, 2018-06-21 (; similar)
“KopperCoin—A Distributed File Storage With Financial Incentives”, Et Al 2016
“KopperCoin—A Distributed File Storage with Financial Incentives”, 2016-11-05 (; similar)
“Validation of Decentralised Smart Contracts Through Game Theory and Formal Methods”, Et Al 2015
“Validation of Decentralised Smart Contracts Through Game Theory and Formal Methods”, 2015-11-20 (; similar)
“Two Party Double Deposit Trustless Escrow in Cryptographic Networks and Bitcoin [BitHalo]”, 2014
“Two Party double deposit trustless escrow in cryptographic networks and Bitcoin [BitHalo]”, 2014-06-07 (; backlinks; similar)
“Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms”, Et Al 2011
“Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms”, 2011-08-04 (; similar)
Wikipedia
Miscellaneous
Link Bibliography
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2022-schwartzbach.pdf: “Payment Schemes from Limited Information With Applications in Distributed Computing”, Nikolaj Ignatieff Schwartzbach: