‘quadratic voting’ tag
- See Also
-
Links
- “Hard Problems in Cryptocurrency: 5 Years Later”, Buterin 2019
- “Radical Results: Gitcoin’s $25K Match—Results and Lessons Learned from Our First $25K in Matching”, Singh 2019
- “Gitcoin Grants: CLR Matching—Matching Contributions With up to $25,000 in Funding, in ETH”, Singh 2019
- “Experiments With Liberal Radicalism: A Crowdfund Matching Mechanism for Public Goods, like Open Source”, Singh 2019
- “Liberal Radicalism: A Flexible Design For Philanthropic Matching Funds”, Buterin et al 2018
- “Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy”, Lalley & Weyl 2018
- “Quadratic Voting and the Public Good: Introduction”, Posner & Weyl 2017
- “A Mechanism for Selecting Public Goods When Preferences Must Be Elicited”, Hylland & Zeckhauser 1980
- “Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem”, Groves & Ledyard 1977
- Wikipedia
- Miscellaneous
- Bibliography
See Also
Links
“Hard Problems in Cryptocurrency: 5 Years Later”, Buterin 2019
“Radical Results: Gitcoin’s $25K Match—Results and Lessons Learned from Our First $25K in Matching”, Singh 2019
Radical Results: Gitcoin’s $25K Match—Results and lessons learned from our first $25K in matching
“Gitcoin Grants: CLR Matching—Matching Contributions With up to $25,000 in Funding, in ETH”, Singh 2019
Gitcoin Grants: CLR Matching—Matching contributions with up to $25,000 in funding, in ETH
“Experiments With Liberal Radicalism: A Crowdfund Matching Mechanism for Public Goods, like Open Source”, Singh 2019
“Liberal Radicalism: A Flexible Design For Philanthropic Matching Funds”, Buterin et al 2018
Liberal Radicalism: A Flexible Design For Philanthropic Matching Funds
“Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy”, Lalley & Weyl 2018
Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy
“Quadratic Voting and the Public Good: Introduction”, Posner & Weyl 2017
“A Mechanism for Selecting Public Goods When Preferences Must Be Elicited”, Hylland & Zeckhauser 1980
A Mechanism for Selecting Public Goods When Preferences Must Be Elicited
“Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem”, Groves & Ledyard 1977
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem
Wikipedia
Miscellaneous
-
https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/glen-weyl-radically-reforming-capitalism-and-democracy/: -
https://ethresear.ch/t/pairwise-coordination-subsidies-a-new-quadratic-funding-design/5553 -
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kHDjtqSiSohZAQyjG/some-thoughts-on-quadratic-funding: -
https://hidorahacks.medium.com/what-is-quadratic-voting-funding-how-did-we-improve-it-70989e813cf9 -
https://www.wired.com/story/colorado-quadratic-voting-experiment/:View External Link:
https://www.wired.com/story/colorado-quadratic-voting-experiment/
Bibliography
-
https://www.gitcoin.co/blog/gitcoin-grants-clr-matching: “Gitcoin Grants: CLR Matching—Matching Contributions With up to $25,000 in Funding, in ETH”, -
2017-posner.pdf: “Quadratic Voting and the Public Good: Introduction”,