‘quadratic voting’ directory
See Also
-
Links
- “Hard Problems in Cryptocurrency: 5 Years Later ”, Buterin 2019
- “Radical Results: Gitcoin’s $25K Match—Results and Lessons Learned from Our First $25K in Matching ”, Singh 2019
- “Gitcoin Grants: CLR Matching—Matching Contributions With up to $25,000 in Funding, in ETH ”, Singh 2019
- “Experiments With Liberal Radicalism: A Crowdfund Matching Mechanism for Public Goods, like Open Source ”, Singh 2019
- “Liberal Radicalism: A Flexible Design For Philanthropic Matching Funds ”, Buterin et al 2018
- “Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy ”, Lalley & Weyl 2018
- “Quadratic Voting and the Public Good: Introduction ”, Posner & Weyl 2017
- “A Mechanism for Selecting Public Goods When Preferences Must Be Elicited ”, Hylland & Zeckhauser 1980
- “Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem ”, Groves & Ledyard 1977
- Wikipedia
- Miscellaneous
- Bibliography
Links
“Hard Problems in Cryptocurrency: 5 Years Later ”, Buterin 2019
“Radical Results: Gitcoin’s $25K Match—Results and Lessons Learned from Our First $25K in Matching ”, Singh 2019
Radical Results: Gitcoin’s $25K Match—Results and lessons learned from our first $25K in matching
“Gitcoin Grants: CLR Matching—Matching Contributions With up to $25,000 in Funding, in ETH ”, Singh 2019
Gitcoin Grants: CLR Matching—Matching contributions with up to $25,000 in funding, in ETH
“Experiments With Liberal Radicalism: A Crowdfund Matching Mechanism for Public Goods, like Open Source ”, Singh 2019
“Liberal Radicalism: A Flexible Design For Philanthropic Matching Funds ”, Buterin et al 2018
Liberal Radicalism: A Flexible Design For Philanthropic Matching Funds
“Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy ”, Lalley & Weyl 2018
Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy
“Quadratic Voting and the Public Good: Introduction ”, Posner & Weyl 2017
“A Mechanism for Selecting Public Goods When Preferences Must Be Elicited ”, Hylland & Zeckhauser 1980
A Mechanism for Selecting Public Goods When Preferences Must Be Elicited
“Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem ”, Groves & Ledyard 1977
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem
Wikipedia
Miscellaneous
https://80000hours.org/ podcast/ episodes/ glen-weyl-radically-reforming-capitalism-and-democracy/ : https://ethresear.ch/ t/ pairwise-coordination-subsidies-a-new-quadratic-funding-design/ 5553 https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/ posts/ kHDjtqSiSohZAQyjG/ some-thoughts-on-quadratic-funding : https://hidorahacks.medium.com/ what-is-quadratic-voting-funding-how-did-we-improve-it-70989e813cf9 https://www.wired.com/ story/ colorado-quadratic-voting-experiment/ :
Bibliography
2017-posner.pdf: “Quadratic Voting and the Public Good: Introduction ”,