Bibliography (14):

1. Moral Hazard and Observability

2. The Provision of Incentives in Firms

3. Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts

4. Are CEOS Rewarded for Luck? The Ones without Principals Are

5. Wikipedia Bibliography:

   1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oliver_Hart_(economist)  :

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oliver_Hart_(economist)

   2. Bengt Holmström  :

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bengt_Holmstr%C3%B6m

   3. Contract theory  :

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contract_theory

   4. Principal-agent problem

   5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principal%E2%80%93agent_problem#Contract_design  :

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principal%E2%80%93agent_problem#Contract_design

   6. Variance

   7. Risk aversion

   8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tournament_theory  :

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tournament_theory

   9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Lazear  :

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Lazear

   10. Sherwin Rosen  :

       https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherwin_Rosen