“Incentive Engineering: for Computational Resource Management”, Eric Drexler, Mark S. Miller1988 (algorithms, mechanism design)⁠:

[see also “Capability-based Financial Instruments”, Miller2000] Agoric computation will require market-compatible mechanisms for the allocation of processor time and storage space.

Recasting processor scheduling as an auction process yields a flexible priority system. Recasting storage management as a system of decentralized market negotiations yields a distributed garbage collection algorithm able to collect unreferenced loops that cross trust boundaries.

Algorithms that manage processor time and storage in ways that enable both conventional computation and market-based decision making will be useful in establishing ‘agoric systems’: they lie at the boundary between design and evolution. We describe such algorithms in some detail.

[See: E, Caja, Ethereum.]

See Also:

• Unleashing True Utility Computing with Quicksand

• Distributed Deep Learning in Open Collaborations

• Profiling a warehouse-scale computer

• Optimal Procurement with Quality Concerns

• Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions [blog]

• Self-Resolving Prediction Markets for Unverifiable Outcomes

• Communication in Economic Mechanisms

• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

• Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail