“Influencer Cartels”, Marit Hinnosaar, Toomas Hinnosaar2024-05-16 (ads, sociology of tech)⁠:

[blog] Social media influencers account for a growing share of marketing worldwide. We demonstrate the existence of a novel form of market failure in this advertising market: influencer cartels, where groups of influencers collude to increase their advertising revenue by inflating their engagement.

Our theoretical model shows that influencer cartels can improve consumer welfare if they expand social media engagement to the target audience, or reduce welfare if they divert engagement to less relevant audiences.

We validate the model empirically using novel data on influencer cartels [on Instagram, coordinated via Telegram] combined with machine learning tools, and derive policy implications for how to maximize consumer welfare.

…Our back-of-the-envelope calculations show that if an advertiser pays for cartel engagement as if it is natural engagement, they only get 3–18% of the value in the case of general cartels and 60–85% in the case of topic cartels.

[Keywords: influencers, marketing, collusion, natural language processing, LLMs, Latent Dirichlet Allocation]