“Propaganda As a Lens for Assessing Xi Jinping’s Leadership”, Ashley Esarey2021-03-24 (; similar)⁠:

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This article examines Xi Jinping’s usage of state propaganda since his rise as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012.

Through a comparison of reportage on Xi and other national leaders and the consideration of case studies from the Mao and Xi periods, it argues that Xi has made more extensive use of propaganda in the People’s Daily than any leader since the founding of the People’s Republic, with the possible exception of Mao Zedong.

By evaluating a ‘Xi Jinping effect’ in propaganda, this article suggests Xi has leant heavily on media power to project authority over the Party and beyond. Xi Jinping’s ascent has also coincided with reduced emphasis on other leaders, providing evidence for the weakening of collective leadership in China.

Research Method: Using the ‘full text’ search function of the CNKI database, and restricting returns to the People’s Daily from the year 2000182018, this article tracks the frequency with which articles in People’s Daily mention Chinese leaders by name, including such paramount leaders as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and every Politburo Standing Committee member from the 16th Party Congress to the 19th National Party Congress. Findings are discussed below.

Due to limitations in the date range of the CNKI database, it was not possible to use the same method to compare media coverage of Xi Jinping with China’s powerful founding leader, Mao Zedong, during the decades in which Mao held power. To compare propaganda related to these 2 leaders, an approach is employed that examines People’s Daily headlines for 1 month in 6 different case studies. The cases are selected with the aim of shedding light on how Xi and Mao, along with other national figures, have been portrayed during mass mobilization and domestic and international crises.

Figure 3: People’s Daily Reports on Hu Jintao vs. Xi Jinping