“Hipsters and the Cool: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Identity Expression, Trends, and Fads”, 2021-12-30 (; backlinks; similar):
[preprint] Cultural trends and popularity cycles can be observed all around us, yet our theories of social influence and identity expression do not explain what perpetuates these complex, often unpredictable social dynamics.
We propose a theory of social identity expression based on the opposing, but not mutually exclusive, motives to conform and to be unique among one’s neighbors in a social network.
We find empirical evidence for both conformity and uniqueness motives in an analysis of the popularity of given names. Generalizing across forms of identity expression, we then model the social dynamics that arise from these motives. We find that the dynamics typically enter random walks or stochastic limit cycles rather than converging to a static equilibrium. The dynamics also exhibit momentum, preserve diversity, and usually produce more conformity between neighbors, in line with empirical stylized facts. We also prove that without social network structure or, alternatively, without the uniqueness motive, reasonable adaptive dynamics would necessarily converge to equilibrium.
Thus, we show that nuanced psychological assumptions (recognizing preferences for uniqueness along with conformity) and realistic social network structure are both critical to our account of the emergence of complex, unpredictable cultural trends.
[Keywords: conformity, games on social networks, popularity cycles, social dynamics, uniqueness]
…Why instead do behavioral patterns go through perpetual change, with particular behaviors cycling into and out of fashion as cultural trends play out? One explanation, tracing back to 1957, is that an upper class tries to distinguish itself from the common folk while the common folk try to imitate them (see also 1950). Accordingly, conformity may be particularly high among the middle class (2001). In modern models of identity signaling, membership in one group may be preferable to membership in another, and people want to strategically distinguish themselves from those in the less-favorable group (2007). The resulting dynamic of imitation and differentiation (or “chase-and-flight”) can lead to fashion cycles (1995; 2004; et al 2018). Undoubtedly, there are contexts in which elites initiate fashions and everyone else strives to imitate them, but empirical research shows that in many other contexts, groups with lower or equal status also strive to differentiate themselves (2008). A dynamic of mutual differentiation, without imitation, cannot account for popularity cycles.
Other models of popularity cycles rely on people continually discovering new behaviors, which spread through the population and then get discarded, either through random imitation (Bentley et al 200420ya, Bentley et al 200717ya), or with a motive for conformity or anti-conformity (2014), or with the co-evolution of behavior and preferences (Acerbi et al 201212ya). These models account for boom-and-bust cycles of popularity, but do not attempt to explain the source of the new behaviors that continually enter the model and keep the dynamics from converging to equilibrium.
This article explores a new account of the dynamics of cultural trends and popularity cycles. We show that along with conformity and uniqueness motives, a realistic network of social interaction may be a critical ingredient for complex social dynamics to emerge. Specifically, we show that reasonable adaptive dynamics, that would necessarily converge to a static equilibrium given random interactions in a well-mixed pool of people, instead typically enter random walks or stochastic limit cycles, and thus never converge, when interactions are restricted to individuals’ local neighborhoods in their social networks. The social dynamics cannot converge in some cases as some people find more preferred expressions of identity, they disrupt others who observe them, making these other people dissatisfied with the identities they had previously been happy to express. The social network structure determines who are the innovators and who are the followers.
[Phys.org: “I wanted to use math to describe 2 conflicting motives—wanting to fit in and wanting to stand out at the same time”, said Golman. “They push you in opposite directions but you can want both things.”
Mathematically speaking, the desire to fit in would drive behavior toward the mean, or average, in the group while the desire to stand out would drive behavior away from the mode, or most common occurrence, in the group.
“Put them together”, Golman said, “and they still lead to equilibrium.” To break out of the equilibrium conundrum, Golman and his team added social networks to the mix. According to Golman, that means communities, neighbors, colleagues, clubs, or other social groups, not necessarily social media.
“It was surprising that social networks could make such a big difference”, said Golman. “We modeled the dynamics with a lot of different networks, and not converging to equilibrium is actually pretty typical.”
To test their new model, CMU Ph.D. student Erin Bugbee turned to the large database of baby names managed by the Social Security Administration for the last century. If baby names settled into an equilibrium, the most popular name would always be the most popular.
That is not what happened. As the popularity of one name, say ‘Emily’, peaks, parents may decide to forgo that name and pick a similar one, like ‘Emma’. By following this strategy, they are instilling in their new daughter a name that is socially acceptable by its similarity to the popular name but will allow her to stand out in the crowd by putting an unique twist on her identity. Many parents may be thinking the same thing and the number of little girls named ‘Emily’ will decline while those named ‘Emma’ will increase.]