“Beliefs Are Like Possessions”, 1986-10-01 ():
In this paper, I propose a theoretical perspective on the nature of beliefs, a perspective with novel features. I want to argue that for most people, in many important cases, “beliefs are like possessions.” I will begin by explaining briefly what led me to this argument, and then gradually detail the propositions composing the theoretical perspective. Finally, I will outline the psychological consequences of the proposed view. Along the way, I suggest several lines of research that might confirm, refute, or reshape it.
The view I will present has incubated in my thinking for many years, spurred by 2 considerations: first, puzzlement over certain rather mysterious results in the literature on persuasion; and second, a reanalysis of the way people might acquire and exercise their beliefs’ and attitudes.
[Presents a theoretical perspective on the nature of beliefs that compares beliefs to possessions. Examination of the factors involved in persuasion indicates that reasoned argument is far less powerful than is the communicator’s style and often irrational elements. Metaphoric expressions in common usage suggest that beliefs are perceived much like possessions. Circumstances inducing “possession” of a belief include public commitment, suffering, detailed explanation and elaboration, defense, attribution of longevity, and development of an awareness of value. The psychological sources and consequences of beliefs are outlined, and means of researching the hypotheses embedded in the new theory are suggested.]
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