“Report to Congress on Stockpile Reliability, Weapon Remanufacture, and the Role of Nuclear Testing”, 1987-10-12 (; backlinks):
This report has been prepared in response to a request from Congressmen L. Aspin, N. D. Dicks, D. B. Fascell, E. J. Markey, and J. M. Spratt, and Senator E. M. Kennedy, to Dr. Roger Batzel, the Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Dr. Batzel was asked to make Dr. Ray Kidder available to study two issues: (1) “whether past warhead reliability problems demonstrate that nuclear explosive testing is needed to identify or to correct stockpile reliability”, or (2) “whether a program of stockpile inspection, nonnuclear testing, and remanufacture would be sufficient to deal with stockpile reliability problems.” In his response, Dr. Batzel indicated that Dr. Kidder would be available to perform the requested study, and that materials would be made available to him for his review. Dr. Batzel also indicated that Dr. George Miller, Associate Director for Defense Systems at LLNL, would prepare a separate report analyzing the issues. This report presents the findings of Dr. Miller and his coauthors.
Chapter 1 examines the reasons for nuclear testing. Although the thrust of the request from Congressman Aspin et al has to do with the need for nuclear testing as it relates to stockpile reliability and remanufacture, there are other very important reasons for nuclear testing. Since there has been increasing interest in the US Congress for more restrictive nuclear test limits, we have addressed the overall need for nuclear testing and the potential impact of further nuclear test limitations.
Chapter 1 also summarizes the major conclusions of a recent study conducted by the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee (SAAC) for the President of the University of California; the SAAC report is entitled, “Nuclear Weapon Tests: The Role of the University of California-Department of Energy Laboratories.” The SAAC spent many days at LLNL and LANL in direct discussions with numerous experienced weapon design personnel. They received classified briefings and read classified material on the subjects of weapon reliability, the role of nuclear testing, and the measures the Laboratories have been taking to prepare for further nuclear test limitations. There was much interchange and discussion on these topics. The depth of the SAAC study far exceeds that of any other independent review of these topics.
Chapter 2 presents a brief history of stockpile problems that involved post-deployment nuclear testing for their resolution. Chapter 3 addresses the problems involved in remanufacturing nuclear weapons, and Chapter 4 discusses measures that should be taken to prepare for possible future restrictive test limits.