“The Irrelevance of the Medical Model of Mental Illness to Law and Ethics”, 1994 ():
[Paper analyzes the logical steps in the argument that mental disorders (MDs) are illnesses, and states that the illness definition of MDs is either circular or fallacious. The involvement of the illness labeling of MDs in involuntary commitment, insurance payments, and in public attitudes is discussed.
The argument of Thomas Szasz (Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry: An Inquiry into the Social Uses of Mental Health Practices, 1963) that mental illness is a myth and should not be the justification either to confine an individual or to excuse that person’s actions is examined.
The philosophical debate about determinism and moral responsibility is discussed.
Alternate constructs of biological causation of MDs are discussed, together with their implications.
It is concluded that the medical definition of MDs has no relevance to the development of social policy relating to MDs.]
…We know that certain people behave in ways that might be characterized as abnormal, deviant, incomprehensible, irrational, dangerous, or disturbing. We know that this behavior, like all behavior, is biologically caused. What further knowledge do we gain by positing a definition of illness and determining that some or all of this behavior does or does not fit it? The answer is: none. Let us therefore leave behind the complexities of the illness analysis and the misguided attempts to distinguish among types of behavior on the basis of biological causation. Instead, using what we know about the characteristics of these types of behavior and the people who exhibit them, let us direct our efforts toward identifying, evaluating, and balancing the costs and benefits of various policies toward the mentally disordered so that we may treat them rationally, compassionately, and justly.