“A Longevity Mechanism of Chinese Absolutism”, 2022-04-01 ():
A counterpart of what is known as “European exceptionalism”—political stability and institutional arrangement that enabled modern economic growth and political development—is a “Chinese anomaly.” This anomaly takes the form of a sharp contrast with premodern Europe: Chinese imperial rulers stayed in power longer than their European counterparts, but this political stability was accompanied by a high level of institutional stasis.
In this article, we argue that a well-known Chinese institution, the civil service examination (CSE) system, contributed to China’s imperial longevity.
We use detailed historical data on individual CSE performance to demonstrate the longevity-contributory mechanisms of CSE—constraining access to power by aristocrats and other wealth holders [because the emperor personally oversaw high-level exams and discriminated against aristocratic candidates to destroy their power & elevate commoners].
We argue that a key to unpacking the so-called Chinese anomaly is to understand the role of bureaucracy in political development in China and potentially in other regions.