“King Frederick William II And The Decline Of The Prussian Army, 1786–111797227ya”, 1980 ():
In 1763 the Kingdom of Prussia emerged victorious from the sanguinary Seven Years War. During this struggle her military forces had taken on the combined armies of France, Austria and Russia, plus those of a number of lesser nations. In the course of the fighting Prussia had held her opponents to a standstill and had maintained her claim to the province of Silesia. Thus Prussia, a state hitherto as little-regarded as Sicily, had, with only peripheral aid from her ally Britain, repulsed the united efforts of most of Europe to crush her and secured for herself the status of a Great Power.
Prussia’s Army, led with brilliance and ruthless determination by her King, Frederick II, “Frederick the Great”, acquired during the war a reputation for inspired and intrepid professionalism that made it a model for the other military establishments of Europe for the next 3 decades. The strategic and tactical concepts of this army, and its leader, were universally accepted as the last word in military development.
The reputation gained during the 7 Years War caused most Prussian leaders to fail into a complacent acquiescence with the status quo bequeathed them by Frederick. Military tactics and organization rigidified into set patterns and practices which increasingly allowed for less and less deviation.
The accession to the Prussian Throne in 1786 of Frederick William II raised some hope that reforms of the rigid Prussian military system might be undertaken. Unfortunately the new sovereign lacked either the force of character or dedicated application to undertake more than the most minor and marginal reforms and changes.
Devoting most of his energies to things sensual and amatory, Frederick William II was in the main content to leave military affairs in the hands of the increasingly-elderly military Establishment created by his uncle. Despite some very slight alterations in equipment and tactics, and a moderate increase in more mobile infantry and cavalry soldiers, the old Prussian pattern was not sensibly altered. This unreformed system was soon forced to confront a challenge from revolutionary forces which were altering the military as well as the political climate of Europe.
From 1792 until 1795 Prussian forces were engaged in a bitter but often desultory struggle with the rapidly-growing forces of Revolutionary France. The area of operations ran from the North Sea and Flanders through the Rhineland. In this area Prussian troops (and their allies) encountered military forces possessed of a new tactical expertise and revolutionary political enthusiasm hitherto unknown to them.
Though inconclusive, and terminated due to Prussia’s political ambitions in Poland, this early campaign against the French saw the Prussian system demonstrate how totally inadequate it was to deal with the military and political challenges of the Revolutionary Era.
In the main, the failure of the Prussian Army, and its subsequent humiliation and near-destruction in 1806, was due not to its decline from the standards of the great Frederick but because of its failure to advance beyond them.
Frederick II and the Prussian Army, 1740–63
The Prussian Army 1756–63: Challenge and Change.
The Fossilization of the Army, 1778–86
The Prussian Army Under Frederick William II
The Transformation of the French Army, 1789–92
Prussia Versus the Revolution, 1792–31795229ya
Was There Truly a Decline?
…Sometimes the methods did not stop short at kidnapping at all. For example the case of an exceptionally tall Italian priest who was sandbagged by Frederick William’s agents while he was saying mass.