“Impact of Darknet Market Seizures on Opioid Availability”, 2021-02-01 (; backlinks; similar):
Opioids, including the highly potent synthetic opioids fentanyl and carfentanil, are commonly sold on illicit cryptomarkets or Tor darknet markets. Data collected throughout 2019 from 12 large darknet markets that sold opioids enabled observation of the impact of law enforcement seizures and voluntary or scam market closures on the availability of fentanyl and other opioids.
Trends in opioid and fentanyl availability before and after law enforcement interventions indicate whether market operators and sellers are deterred and whether market closures lead to displacement, dispersal or substitution. Evidence of all of these outcomes was present in both descriptive and trend analyses, although most effects were short lived. Market closures, especially law enforcement seizures, reduced the availability of opioids, in particular fentanyl, as well as increasing prices and displacing vendors to other markets. Market closures also led vendors to substitute fentanyl for other opioids or other illicit drugs.
Opioids, including the highly potent synthetic opioid fentanyl and carfentanil, which has the potential to be used as a chemical weapon, are commonly sold on illicit cryptomarkets or Tor darknet markets. This report investigates the impact of darknet market closures (voluntary or exit scams) and law enforcement market seizures on the availability of fentanyl and other opioids. Quantitative methods were used to investigate the presence of potential effects of closures and seizures. We analysed these effects across four dimensions: opioid availability (as measured by unique listings), vendor or trader movement and cross-market activity, market stock value and variations in the prices of opioid products. A unique product listings time series was constructed, and the time series was then split into several sub-intervals based on the timing of market closures.
Data were collected over 352 days, from 2 January to 20 December 2019 (excluding weekends), combining 251 scrapes from initially eight darknet markets: Apollon, Empire, Dream, Nightmare, Tochka (also known as Point), Berlusconi, Valhalla (also called Silkitie), and Wall Street. In April three ‘new’ markets (Agartha, Dream Alt and Samsara) were added after Wall Street and Valhalla were seized by law enforcement and Dream voluntarily closed. In July Cryptonia was added as a substitute for Nightmare, which closed in an exit scam (where a business stops sending orders but continues to accept payment for new orders). Cryptonia operated until a planned (voluntary) closure in November
Darknet markets have presented unique problems to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) since the inception of Farmer’s Market in 2006, and its subsequent move to the Tor hidden service in 2010. In 2011 Silk Road 1 emerged as a substantial innovation, combining then relatively novel cryptocurrencies with the anonymity of Tor, before it was seized and its operators arrested in 2013. The Silk Road model proved enduring and darknet markets continued to evolve. Accordingly, LEA operational techniques continue to adapt to the criminal use of the Tor platform and, as with cybercrime in general, transnational policing methods have become essential.
In early 2019, a transnational law enforcement task force of US and European LEAs, the Joint Criminal Opioid and Darknet Enforcement (J-CODE) team, focused on the darknet trade in fentanyl. J-CODE’s Operation SaboTor targeted Wall Street, a darknet market that was then among the most active in selling fentanyl and its derivatives. Under Operation SaboTor, Finnish Customs (with French National Police and Europol) seized Valhalla in February 2019, and then in April the German Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt) arrested three Germans who operated Wall Street. Another 61 associated vendors or dealers, mostly located in the US and Europe, were also arrested. In May a major online gateway, DeepDotWeb, which linked buyers to darknet market URLs, was also seized by the J-CODE team. Throughout 2019, several other darknet markets also closed, either in exit scams (Nightmare in July, Tochka in November) or in voluntary closures (Dream Market in March, Cryptonia in November). In September 2019, as part of Operation Darknet, the Italian Guardia di Finanza seized Berlusconi, a market that was also active in the sale of fentanyl and other opioids.
The potential deterrence of market operators and sellers and the displacement, dispersal or product substitution that may follow such closures were explored by comparing trends in opioid and fentanyl availability before and after law enforcement interventions. Evidence of all of these outcomes was present in both descriptive and trend analyses, although effects were often short lived. Analysis also showed that market closures, especially seizures of markets by law enforcement, reduced the availability of opioids, in particular fentanyl, increased prices and displaced vendors to other markets. Market closures also led buyers to substitute fentanyl for other illicit drugs or other opioids.
Throughout 2019 a total of 2,089,694 listings, excluding duplicates, were identified, advertising a diverse range of illicit drugs and other contraband. 3% (n = 63,567) of these listings were opioids, of which ~5% (n = 3,151) were fentanyl. Among fentanyl listings, 19% (n = 606) were the extremely potent analogue carfentanil.
Over the observed period, Berlusconi offered the greatest number of unique listings, representing 36% of all listings. The items identified included illicit drugs, digital products such as malware and other contraband. Berlusconi also had the highest number of opioid listings (again at 36%) while Wall Street dominated listings of fentanyl (55%) and carfentanil (41%) until its seizure in April 2019. Tochka accounted for 21% of fentanyl and 30% of carfentanil availability until its exit scam in November of that year.
After the closure of Dream and the seizures of Valhalla and Wall Street, the April–July 2019 period saw the largest growth of opioid listings—from 5,320 at the end of April to 16,930 at the end of July. Yet this period also saw a decline in fentanyl listings: from 792 at the end of April to 531 listings by the end of July, and in December only seven listings (five of which advertised carfentanil) remained on Empire. Wall Street dominated fentanyl availability between January and April, but after its seizure Tochka took over the dominant market share until its exit scam in November. New markets also took up some market share after Tochka’s closure.
Over the observed period, 4,156 opioid vendors with unique aliases were identified. Roughly three-quarters (74%) of these vendors (n = 3,090) operated in only one market, while the remaining 26% of vendors (n = 1,066) operated across two or more markets. Almost one in five opioid vendors sold fentanyl (n = 793), with about a quarter (n = 212) of these advertising carfentanil.
This study shows the strengths and limitations of LEA operations targeting darknet markets. The results suggest that LEA operations targeting specific high-risk products (eg. fentanyl) on darknet markets have a greater impact than voluntary closures or exit scams. However, there has always been an element of self-regulation in the operation of darknet markets, such as the widespread policy of banning the listing of child exploitation material. Many markets respond to LEA interventions by implementing further self-regulation of high-risk products. Potent synthetic opioids such as fentanyl and its derivatives were widely banned by many darknet markets throughout 2018 and 2019, indicating that the darknet market economy is risk sensitive and evolving.
LEA operations targeting darknet markets require a long-term effort, with success often the consequence of user error and complacency. Darknet criminal actors are aware of LEA disruption efforts and may underestimate the risks associated with policing activities such as undercover operations and the arrests of vendors and buyers. Market displacement and dispersal as a consequence of closures (voluntary or exit scams) and police operations make buyers, sellers and market operators more adaptable and risk averse.
The implications for criminal justice policy and policing practice are discussed and the probable forms of organised crime and criminal enterprise that may comprise the darknet economy are considered. Transnational and cross-agency police cooperation is crucial in the investigation and prosecution of darknet market players. Persistent surveillance and suppression will be necessary if the availability of the most dangerous synthetic opioids is to be disrupted. The darknet economy has proven to be resilient, and the large profits to be earned from fentanyl, carfentanil and other opioids ensure that these and other products will continue to be available on some darknet markets.