

Information Control and Public Support for Social Credit Systems in China

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Critics see China's social credit system (SCS) as a tool of surveillance and repression. Yet opinion surveys in China find considerable public support for the SCS. We explain this puzzle by focusing on citizens' lack of knowledge regarding the repressive nature of digital surveillance in dictatorships, which can be attributed to (1) invisible and targeted repression associated with digital surveillance and (2) government propaganda and censorship further concealing its repressive potential. A field survey experiment on 750 college students in three Chinese regions shows that revealing the SCS's repressive potential significantly reduces support for the system, but emphasizing its social-order-maintenance function does not increase support. Observational evidence from the field survey and a nationwide survey of 2,028 Chinese netizens show that the support is higher if citizens knew about the SCS through state media. Our findings highlight the role of information and framing in shaping public opinion on digital surveillance.

While digital technologies have made people's lives much more convenient, they provide governments with powerful new tools to intervene in society. By 2018, more than 30 countries (15 autocracies) are deploying digital surveillance tools to monitor, track, and surveil citizens, and this number is rapidly increasing. Among these regimes, China's surveillance state has drawn global attention because of its unprecedented size, sophistication, and international influence—more than 18 countries have adopted China's surveillance technologies as of 2019 (see Polyakova and Meserole 2019). Recently, particular heed is paid to China's social credit system (SCS), a surveillance system that rewards and punishes citizens on the basis of assessments of their "trustworthiness."¹ Although still in its pilot stage, the SCS has collected a large

amount of information on citizens' personal, financial, behavioral, and even political conduct to construct their social scores (Wang 2017). Low-score citizens are banned from flights, trains, hotels, good schools, social benefits, government jobs, and so on. Critics raised serious concerns about the SCS's repressive nature, as it has been used to track and punish political activists and human rights lawyers (Gan 2019).² Yet, opinion surveys from China find considerable public support for the SCS (Kostka 2019) and for digital surveillance in general (Alsan et al. 2020; Su, Xu, and Cao 2021).

Why would citizens in dictatorships support a powerful surveillance tool that could impose substantial political costs on them? The literature on surveillance and state coercion commonly emphasizes the liberty-security trade-off: citizens

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1. Chinese local governments and e-commerce platforms have different SCSs; we use SCS to represent government-run social credit systems in general.
2. Numerous academic and news articles expressed such concerns (see, e.g., Hoffman 2017; Jiang and Fu 2018; Liang et al. 2018).

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sacrifice political freedom for personal security (Davis and Silver 2004) or societal well-being (Alsan et al. 2020) so that they are willing to support state surveillance (Reddick, Chatfield, and Jaramillo 2015; Ziller and Helbling 2021). However, this argument assumes that citizens are well informed about the political costs of surveillance. This can be an unrealistic assumption even for advanced democracies, largely due to the secret nature of digital surveillance. For example, had Edward Snowden not revealed top secret documents concerning the US government's surveillance operation, the public would not have known the impingement on individual freedom even if mass surveillance had taken place in the United States for years. Citizens are even less informed in dictatorships where the government heavily controls information (Guriev and Treisman 2020; Wallace 2016). In this article, we argue that citizens' support for the SCS, and digital surveillance in general, can be partly explained by a lack of information concerning the repressive potential of digital surveillance.

Surveillance can certainly bring social benefits. In authoritarian systems, the rule of law is weak because dictators are reluctant to tie their own hands with independent judiciaries and legislatures. Underdeveloped judicial systems often result in widespread corruption, incivilities, violations of contracts, and social distrust in authoritarian societies. State surveillance can be used to collect information about citizens' misconduct and enforce social contracts. With the help of digital technology, China's SCS was created to promote social order and foster trust in society. This order-maintenance function is an important reason behind the public support for the SCS in China. However, despite its promised social benefits, the SCS has great repressive potential.³ The SCS is essentially a surveillance system because the first step to generate social scores for individual citizens is to collect massive information concerning citizens' social, personal, financial, and political activities. Such detailed information allows the government to identify political opponents for repression. Repressing opponents is also easy under the SCS because the government can simply lower an individual's social score to restrict her access to a variety of services and benefits. In dictatorships where the government faces constant threats from the masses but has difficulty identifying regime opponents because of citizens' preference falsification, a surveillance and enforcement platform like the SCS naturally leads to repression. Abundant evidence suggests that Chinese local governments have commonly used the system to repress journalists and stop protesters (Gan 2019; Wang 2017).

3. The SCS has already been used for political repression in China. Here we use "potential" from an individual's perspective: one could be potentially repressed by the system.

What makes the SCS particularly attractive to the repressive apparatus is that political repression under the SCS is less visible to the public than physical repression. In dictatorships, digital surveillance technology facilitates low-profile, targeted repression against dissidents (Xu 2021). Repression under the SCS takes even milder, lower-profile forms. Instead of putting dissidents into jails, the government can lower their social scores to ban them from traveling, buying property, or taking out a loan.⁴ Unlike overt, physical repression that often causes citizen backlash, the milder, more targeted repression entailed by social scoring is less perceivable to the general public and hence less provocative. Moreover, the repression function of the SCS can be disguised under its social-order-maintenance function because of information control in dictatorships. Government propaganda frames the SCS as an effective tool for fostering trustworthiness in society. Censorship helps the government remove negative information about the SCS and conceal targeted repression. Both tools help emphasize the social-order-maintenance functions of the SCS and downplay its role in political repression. As a result, citizens in dictatorships tend to be poorly informed about the SCS's repressive potential.

Citizens' information problem concerning the SCS's repressive potential is of crucial importance for understanding public opinion about the SCS because it affects citizens' calculation of perceived benefits and costs about the system. In other words, citizens support the SCS because they know its social benefits but are not fully aware of its political costs. Thus, revealing information concerning the SCS's role in political repression should decrease public support. Reminding citizens of the SCS's role in social order maintenance, however, is unlikely to further increase their support because such information is already dominant in media and society. We conduct a field survey experiment with a sample of over 750 college students in three regions of China, to examine this information argument. Individuals are randomly assigned to different information treatments about the roles of the SCS: social order maintenance, political repression, or both. The findings from the experiment are consistent with our predictions.

To further test this information mechanism, we examine the heterogeneous treatment effect of the repression information among citizens with different levels of information. The Chinese state media rarely report negative news about the SCS, whereas other information sources such as social media and nonstate media outlets occasionally reveal

4. Way and Levitsky (2006) define low-intensity repression broadly to indicate the state's various efforts to suppress opposition activity. Punishment through the SCS fits into this category.

the SCS's repressive potential.⁵ This allows us to construct a proxy for citizens' awareness of the SCS's repressive potential using sources of their information: individuals who obtain information about the SCS only from state media outlets are considered less informed. Our test on this potential heterogeneous effect indeed shows that the treatment effect of repression information is larger on less informed citizens, that is, those who obtained information about the SCS only from state media and therefore knew less about the repressive nature of the SCS.

One might be concerned that, had the government not used the SCS for political repression in reality, the reason behind the reduced popular support in our experiment would not be citizens' lack of information concerning the SCS's repressive potential but rather the unrealistic repression scenario described in our information treatment. We address this concern from three aspects. First, we discuss the logic behind potential power abuse through the SCS and argue that authoritarian governments have a tendency to use the SCS for repression. Second, we provide evidence that repressing protesters, petitioners, journalists, and political activists via the SCS is common among Chinese localities. Third, we show that revealing the SCS's repressive potential has a weaker effect among better-informed individuals, suggesting that some citizens may have already known the SCS's repressive function from non-state media sources.

In addition to the experimental evidence, we use observational data to explore the role of information on citizen's support for the SCS. State-run news media—China's propaganda machine—provide abundant information on the SCS's social-order-maintenance functions but conceal its repressive potential. Using the aforementioned field survey and a nationwide survey of 2,028 Chinese internet users, we find that citizens are more likely to support the SCS if they obtained information about the SCS from state media instead of other sources. The finding is not driven by individuals' risk preferences, insecurity, obedience, and social desirability bias. Interestingly, we also find that citizens' support for the SCS is positively associated with their tendency to avoid discredited friends, and citizens with lower interpersonal trust support the SCS more.

One key assumption of our theory is that state media in China rarely, if at all, report SCS's repressive potential. To provide supporting evidence for this government information control assumption, we collect about 650 scripts of TV news reports and news articles that contain "social credit" in their title or text from the three most important state media outlets in

China: the Chinese Central Television (CCTV) News Reports, the *People's Daily*, and the *Global Times*. We conduct sentiment analysis manually and find that only 2.9% of the scripts and articles have paragraphs or sentences on SCS that can be considered negative. Moreover, most of the 16 unique negative articles only express concerns over local governments' overdoing of SCSs for social order maintenance (punishing jaywalking, unpaid parking fees, job turnover, etc.). Only one article mentions a "credit deduction for illegal petitioning" that is related to political repression. The evidence suggests that Chinese state media indeed discuss SCSs in a very positive way and avoid revealing its political repression function.

This article contributes to a growing body of literature on state surveillance and repression. In the past two decades, the world has witnessed a rapid expansion of digital surveillance in dictatorships such as Russia (Haraszti et al. 2010, 27), Turkey (Çelik 2013), Egypt (Gohdes 2014, 34), Bahrain (Marczak et al. 2014), and Syria (Gohdes 2014, 91). Technologies such as spyware, metadata collection, digital cameras, facial recognition, and artificial intelligence (AI) have empowered dictators to identify demonstrators and political opponents for targeted repression (Gunitsky 2015; Xu 2021). While previous studies have examined the various impacts of digital surveillance on the state and society, we know much less about citizens' attitudes toward surveillance. This article shows that citizens in dictatorships may actually support digital surveillance (e.g., the SCS) when they know its social benefits but have limited information about its repressive potential. This information problem partially explains why in authoritarian countries digital surveillance has rapidly expanded without encountering much resistance from society.

Since the onset of the big data era, there has been voluminous literature on how data and AI technologies transform people's economic, social, and political lives (e.g., Jones and Tonetti 2019; Liu 2018). Recently, China's SCS have received considerable attention in both media and academia (e.g., Engelman et al. 2019; Wang 2017). From a theoretical perspective, Tirole (2021) develops a comprehensive model to explore the good and evil aspects of social score systems. A particular insight from Tirole's model is that social score systems enable the state to leverage social sanctions to suppress dissent or force citizens to conform to its rules. Empirically, Kostka and Antoine (2020) find that citizens reported behavior changes in response to the SCS in China, suggesting that the SCS is a powerful tool of social engineering. Our article contributes to the literature by highlighting the invisible, low-profile method that the SCS entails—another feature that would make the system an effective tool for repression.

The theory and evidence from this article also speak to the literature on citizens' liberty-security trade-offs (e.g.,

5. Because the SCS has not been implemented nationwide, most citizens only know about the SCS from state media outlets or other indirect sources.

Davis and Silver 2004). Recently, Conrad et al. (2018) showed that Americans support torture when it is directed at individuals whom they perceive as threatening. Dietrich and Crabtree (2019) suggest that citizens are willing to support the state violating their rights for the promise of greater security. Ziller and Helbling (2021) show that Europeans support state surveillance if it targets potential criminals and if a security threat is salient. A common argument in this literature is that citizens sacrifice freedom for security and thus support state coercion, especially when they do not consider themselves victims of state coercion. This article adds to the existing literature in three important ways. First, it highlights that citizens may have insufficient information about the political costs of state coercion. Second, it finds that citizens decrease support for policies associated with state coercion even if the information revealed that other citizens (not themselves) suffer the political costs. Third, the evidence in this article suggests that public opinion on state coercion is prone to state information control.

It is important to note that, although repression practiced through the SCS is evident among Chinese localities, the system has yet to become an Orwellian-style repressive tool. We do not advance that the development of a social scoring system inevitably leads to dystopic outcomes. Besides, conflicting interests among state agencies (Mertha 2009), local governments' fiscal burdens (Oi 2020), data quality and standardization issues, and private firms' data protection may hamper the government's effort in developing a nationwide SCS in China. Moreover, we find that raising citizens' awareness of repression can substantially lower their support for the SCS, suggesting that the support is not very stable, and aggressively rolling out the SCS would cause citizen backlash. This implies that the central government may need to contain aggressive local practices. Nevertheless, if the government can carefully disguise the SCS's repressive function under its social benefits, the huge amount of information integrated by the SCS and its power in shaping citizen behavior will make it an effective tool of political control.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Digital surveillance can be used to enforce social contracts in authoritarian societies. Unlike Western democracies where legal development involves legislatures and independent judiciaries that ultimately constrain executive discretion, authoritarian regimes are reluctant to create a well-functioning legal infrastructure since an independent legal system likely makes the dictator worse off (e.g., by threatening the dictator's privileges or survival; Liu and Weingast 2020; Wang 2015). Consequently, authoritarian societies struggle with incivilities, corruption, fraud, contract enforcement problems, high trans-

action costs, and widespread mistrust among citizens. Digital surveillance like the SCS helps authoritarian governments gather information about the behavior of citizens, companies, and organizations to create a centralized platform that honors agreements, reports disputes, and adheres to the judgments of the courts. These are essentially the functions of contract enforcement institutions (Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast 1994).

However, a coercive tool powerful enough to enforce social contracts can also be employed by the state to prey on the citizenry (Tilly 1985). The threat of power abuse is particularly salient in dictatorships because authoritarian systems lack commitment mechanisms to constrain the dictator (North and Weingast 1989). Digital surveillance collects refined information about citizens, allowing the government to identify regime opponents. The platform that honors social agreements can be used to punish political opponents or dissidents. In authoritarian regimes where the dictator is constantly under threat from the disenfranchised masses but poorly informed because of citizens' preference falsification, a centralized platform for surveillance and contract enforcement will lead to political repression.

Political repression is the act of a state entity controlling a citizenry by force for political reasons (Davenport 2007). Traditional methods of repression such as crackdowns on protesters are costly to dictators. They undermine regime legitimacy, reduce citizen cooperation, and cause antiregime backlash (Aytaç, Schiumerini, and Stokes 2018; Gerschewski 2013). To mitigate the costs of repression, dictators around the world often conceal or legitimize the use of repression against citizens. For example, the authoritarian governments framed the bloody crackdowns of Rabiaa al-Adawiya Square in Egypt and Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan as counterterrorism actions to gain public support (Edel and Josua 2018).

The development of the SCS mitigates the negative consequences of repression. A social scoring system combines information collection and individualized punishments that allows the state to conduct targeted repression. To generate a social score for each citizen, the system gathers detailed information from a variety of sources such as banks, courts, police departments, transportation bureaus, communities, commercial firms, and even social media platforms. The detailed information allows the government to identify regime opponents and conduct low-profile, targeted repression instead of overt, indiscriminate repression. In addition, individualized punishments such as travel bans and bank loan restrictions help the government efficiently repress individual dissidents. Information about dissidents' social networks and easy punishments under the SCS also facilitate relational repression—an even milder form of coercion that uses social ties to demobilize protesters (Deng and O'Brien 2013). As we will

discuss in the next section, Chinese local governments use the SCS to restrict the actions of dissidents and political activists. The milder forms of repression entailed by the SCS are even less visible to the public than targeted physical repression that has been widely adopted to avoid citizen backlash in contemporary dictatorships (Way and Levitsky 2006).

The SCS's repressive potential is further disguised by its social-order-maintenance function. In dictatorships where citizens crave contract enforcement, it is easy for the dictator to promote a social credit platform. The repressive potential of this platform is obscured by its social benefits and then further concealed by the dictator's deliberate information control and manipulation. A great number of authoritarian regimes conduct censorship (Gunitsky 2015); information that could stimulate collective actions, including news about targeted repression against political opponents, is often removed from the public sphere (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013). With the implementation of the SCS, the government will certainly censor information related to targeted repression through the system. In addition, dictatorships employ propaganda to influence public opinion (Guriev and Treisman 2020). The government can frame the social credit system as a tool for maintaining social order and hide its repressive potential. As scholars show, framing significantly alters people's beliefs because individuals often base their opinions on available and accessible considerations without conscious deliberation (Chong and Druckman 2007). Thus, censorship and propaganda will make citizens even less informed about the repressive potential of the SCS.

Citizens' lack of knowledge regarding the SCS's repressive potential has important implications for public opinion toward the SCS. Citizens may support a coercive tool when it helps maintain social order but disapprove of it when it enhances the regime's political control. Whether citizens support the coercive tool depends on its social benefits against potential political costs. However, studies of public opinion have long questioned citizens' competence in understanding complicated political discourse because of limited information (Converse 1964). Citizens' attitudes toward a particular coercive tool are actually based on "perceived" benefits and costs, which are subject to information constraints. Our key argument is that citizens in authoritarian regimes are unlikely to discover the repressive potential of the SCS because repression under the SCS is largely invisible and is further affected by government propaganda and censorship. Yet, citizens are very much aware of the SCS's social-order-maintenance function as it is reflected by the name "social credit" and is intensively promoted by the media (Kostka 2019). Perceiving very low political costs but high social benefits, citizens thus strongly support the SCS in China.

To sum up, citizens in authoritarian regimes are well aware of the social benefits of the SCS but hardly know its repressive potential. Thus, they should be more sensitive to information about the SCS's repressive function than information concerning its social-order-maintenance function.

H1. Revealing the SCS's repressive potential decreases citizens' support, but reminding citizens of its role in social-order maintenance should not further increase citizens' support.

As discussed above, citizens' information problem about the SCS's repressive potential is exacerbated by government information control. This leads to the following prediction.

H2. Citizens are more likely to support the SCS when their information about the system is obtained from state media outlets.

SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEMS IN CHINA

The Chinese government has long realized the potential of the SCS in steering citizen behavior. An early concept of the SCS emerged in 1991 as a government strategy to address problems in the financial sector (Liang et al. 2018). Later, several local governments initiated different local SCSs to experiment with various credit systems. In 2014, the State Council released the Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System. This plan outlines a legal and regulatory framework for implementing a national SCS by 2020. Despite the ambition of the 2014 plan, the SCS is still under development. A national unified system has yet to be developed as of early 2021. Most local SCSs are still platforms where government agencies share data, and those systems are far from "real-time monitoring through big data tools" (Hoffman 2018, 8) as portrayed by Western media and think tanks.

Nevertheless, the functions of local SCSs in China reach far beyond financial regulation.⁶ After the release of the 2014 plan, local governments responded by devising pilot SCSs in their precincts. By 2018, 43 city governments had implemented SCS pilot programs with different practices (fig. 1). These government-run SCSs are intended to be mandatory for all citizens or targeted groups (Kostka and Antoine 2020). The criteria for "social credits" are based not only on the lawfulness but also on the morality of citizens' actions, covering economic, social, and political conduct (Creemers 2018).

6. Several well-known commercial SCSs (e.g., the Zhima Credit and Tencent Credit) were introduced by private firms to facilitate economic transactions following the China Central Bank's Notice on the Preparation of a Personal Credit Service.




Figure 1. Distribution of SCS pilot counties/cities. (Source: Chinese National Development and Reform Committee.)

To steer the behavior of individuals, businesses, and organizations, local governments rely on redlists to reward “trustworthy” behavior and blacklists to punish “untrustworthy” or illegal behavior. Advanced algorithms for calculating social scores are not common among local governments. A few governments developed numerical scores such as the Osmanthus Score (Guihua) in Suzhou City, the Western Chu Score (Xichu) in Suqian City, and the Jasmine Score in Fuzhou City. Some letter-type categories or codes are used for health regulation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Potential punishment of the SCSs includes banning blacklisted individuals from flights, fast trains, hotels, good schools, government jobs, getting bank loans, and so on. Other mild punishments vary from throttling individuals’ internet speeds to releasing their names on billboards, government websites, or social media platforms for public shaming.

There is an ongoing debate concerning the motivations behind the Chinese government’s promotion of SCSs. Much of the Western media coverage and scholarly work on the SCSs is negative, criticizing the government’s political motives and calling the SCSs a sign of “digital dystopia” with a potential for totalitarian control. But some scholars tend to view the SCSs as the government’s effort in maintaining social order and building trust in society. Despite these competing views, scholars agree that Chinese society has many trust issues, be they contract failures, unpaid debts, food safety scandals, pollution, corruption, or employers not paying their workers. The aforementioned

2014 plan has many parts that aim to construct government sincerity, commercial sincerity, social sincerity, and judicial credibility. If properly implemented, as suggested by Chorzempa, Triolo, and Sacks (2018), the plan will raise governance transparency, foster trust in business and among citizens, as well as enhance economic growth.

The 2014 plan and the early practices of the SCS suggest that the Chinese government indeed considered the SCS a tech-enabled solution to social problems in the face of weak institutions. Krause and Fischer (2020) discuss the Chinese government’s economic rationale for setting up the SCS. They argue that information transparency through the SCS reduces the risk inherent in choosing business partners, and the joint punishments and rewards incentivize trustworthy behavior by increasing the costs of noncompliance, which can be regarded as add-ons to the currently rather weak legal system and fragmented government enforcement apparatus. Empirically, Engelmann et al. (2019) analyze 194,829 behavioral records and 942 reports on citizens’ behaviors published on the official Beijing SCS website and the national SCS platform Credit China. They find that the government is using blacklists and redlists on online platforms to reward firms’ honest behavior and punish untrustworthy behavior.

Although publicly released information focuses on the SCS’s role in regulating financial and social behavior, observers have long expressed concerns over government abuse of the systems for political repression (Hoffman 2017; Jiang and Fu

2018; Liang et al. 2018). Even optimistic commentators such as Chorzempa et al. (2018, 1) warn that “based on China’s record of regulating political speech and other activities, there is no doubt that it could also be abused for social control, prying into every aspect of Chinese citizens’ lives and automatically punishing those who don’t toe the party line.” Thus, there are potentially two types of punishments by the SCS: (1) those associated with dishonest behaviors such as contract failures and unpaid debts and (2) those linked with dissidents and political activists. The Chinese government extensively exposes the first type on public blacklists (Engelmann et al. 2019), but it is much less up front about the second type.

Nevertheless, information from the Western media and some Chinese local websites shows that the Chinese government soon realized the SCS’s potential for political control after the launch of the 2014 plan. It uses the SCS to blacklist journalists and human rights lawyers who criticized the government (Wang 2017). Local governments also use local SCSs to repress protesters and petitioners. There are records of blacklisted petitioners on some local SCS websites.⁷ Evidence suggests that repressing dissidents through local SCSs is common, as many local governments have incorporated rules for punishing petitioners and protesters into their SCSs. By early 2019, at least 10 cities in different provinces (e.g., Zhejiang, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Fujian) had enacted such rules.⁸ In these localities, petitioners who fail to follow local governments’ “procedures” will be stripped of social credits or even downgraded. Violations of “procedures” include petitioning near the site of big meetings at the central or local government level, pleading one’s case in “sensitive areas” in Beijing, “making trouble” on the internet, and contacting foreign media. Some local governments further include Falungong, a religious practice that has long been repressed by the Chinese government, into the punishment scheme of their SCSs (see China Law Translate 2019). As the SCS is getting implemented widely in China, evidence of political repression under the SCS is paramount.

To many observers’ surprise, the SCS enjoys a high level of domestic support in China. Opinion surveys find that almost 80% of respondents either somewhat approve or strongly approve the SCS (Kostka 2019). The following sections provide

quantitative evidence on how citizens’ information problem influences public opinion on the SCS in China.

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

Our key argument is that citizens support the SCS because they understand its social-order-maintenance function but lack information about its repressive function. This implies that revealing the SCS’s repressive potential in an experimental setting should reduce citizens’ support for it, but showing its order-maintenance function should not further increase the support because the government has already done so in real life (hypothesis 1). We use a field survey experiment to test this hypothesis.

Field survey experiment

Field survey in three universities. Implementing surveys on sensitive topics is particularly difficult in China because of the government’s tight control over the public sphere. In March 2019, we managed to conduct a field survey among 750 students in three universities in East, North, and West China. We choose three regions to broaden sample representativeness. Figure 2 plots the sample distribution by students’ home provinces. The fact that college students come from different provinces all over China further increases the regional representativeness of our sample.⁹

Among the three universities, two are top ranked and one is ranked slightly lower. We choose elite college students because this demographic group best fits our purpose to examine the impact of information on support for SCSs. Elite college students in China are selected to be technologically savvy and intellectually curious. Additionally, many of our study participants come from advantaged backgrounds with more knowledge about government policies and politics in China. Thus, the students in our sample are likely to be more informed about the SCSs’ repressive potential than other demographic groups even before the experimental intervention. Thus, if we find that revealing SCSs’ repressive potential decreases support from the student sample, the effect would be larger for other Chinese citizens. Nonetheless, one should be cautious when generalizing our results to other demographic groups in China.

In this survey, we ask questions regarding the repressive nature of the SCSs, but the level of sensitivity is within the range of government tolerance because we use the information found in a progressive state newspaper. Conducting the survey experiment on a potentially sensitive topic in the field

7. For example, the Yangzhou government listed several petitioners on its social credit website; see <http://cxyz.yangzhou.gov.cn/662/1471.html> (accessed October 21, 2021).

8. See, e.g., the “Rule for Managing Untrustworthy Petitioners through Social Credit” issued by the Zhenjiang government, as revealed at https://www.sohu.com/a/339774085_99927377 (accessed October 21, 2021). Also see a similar rule in Rongcheng City from a news report (Gan 2019). Caixin News reported seven more cities that have such rules; see “Many Cities Issued Documents to Punish Petitioners” at <https://china.caixin.com/2019-09-12/101461655.html> (accessed October 21, 2021).

9. Three respondents were not born in China. But we include them in the analysis because randomization occurs before the survey. Appendix sec. B.1.6 shows that the results are robust when these observations are dropped.




Figure 2. Sample distribution by respondents' home provinces

circumvents censorship that may be present in China-based online survey platforms. It also helps create trust and cooperation from respondents. More importantly, since we ask individuals' attitudes toward the repression of online criticism, respondents answering surveys online may self-censor to avoid state surveillance (Chang and Manion 2021). An anonymous field survey avoids this problem because respondents answer questions on paper questionnaires that do not record any identifiable information. Appendix section A.1 addresses ethical concerns in detail.

The enumerators surveyed in dining halls and main roads between classroom buildings and residential halls. For a convenience sample, respondents were recruited in those areas to represent the student population better than in dormitories or classrooms because all students come to dining halls and main roads regardless of their majors, genders, and grade levels. In addition, enumerators actively walked around all areas of the survey locations to increase sample representativeness.

Survey questionnaires require 5–10 minutes to complete. Respondents were requested to complete the questionnaire independently to minimize potential spillover effects of the treatments. Each student received five Chinese yuan (about US\$0.75) as compensation for their time. The enumerators first asked students whether they were willing to participate in an anonymous survey, and, if they agreed, the enumerators then presented the five-yuan compensation to them and gave them the questionnaires in random order. Roughly 50% of the students approached by enumerators agreed to participate. This response rate is within the normal range for a field survey.

In addition, most of the nonrespondents refused to participate even before the enumerators explained the survey topic to them—their unwillingness to participate was thus not due to the content of the survey.¹⁰ Thus, it is unlikely that the nonresponses are related to potential outcomes that would bias our results.

Experimental design. We employ a factorial design that randomly assigns respondents into the control condition or one of the three treatment conditions, each with a different framing of the SCS. In treatment scenarios, respondents may receive information about the SCS's roles in social order maintenance (i.e., punishing a drunk driver who caused traffic accidents), political repression (i.e., punishing a citizen who criticized the government), or both. In the control scenario, respondents receive no information about the role of the SCS. See appendix section A.2 for more details about the treatment vignettes. Table A.3 shows that the randomization is successful and the four groups are well balanced.

This factorial design (table 1) allows us to use the entire effective sample of 747 respondents for statistical analysis. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{iu} = \alpha + \delta \text{order}_i + \pi \text{repression}_i + \lambda \text{order and repression}_i + \mu_u + \varepsilon_{iu}, \quad (1)$$

10. The reasons include “no time,” “hungry and need to have lunch,” and “too busy.”

Table 1. Experimental Design for Attitude toward the SCS

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Assignment	Control	Treated	Treated	Treated
Information treatment	No information	Social order maintenance	Political repression	Order and repression
N	204	164	198	181

where Y_{iu} indicates individual i 's support for the SCS, $order_i$ is the information about social order maintenance, $repression_i$ is the information about political repression, $order\ and\ repression_i$ is the treatment information regarding both types, and μ_u indicates university fixed effects.¹¹ We also compare means with two-sample t -tests and find similar results (table B.3).

Experimental findings

Main effects. Our theory suggests that revealing information about the SCS's repressive function should decrease citizens' support, whereas framing it as a tool to maintain social order should not increase individuals' support much. Evidence from figure 3 is consistent with these predictions. The upper panel of figure 3 reports the main effects of the two treatments and the interaction effect between them (i.e., the point estimates in eq. [1]). The lower panel reports the marginal effects of the two treatments: main effects plus the interaction effect.¹² The results show that reminding respondents of the SCS's role in maintaining social order does not change their support for the SCS much, but revealing information about the SCS's role in political control largely reduces respondents' support for the SCS. Given that the average level of support is 7.5 (scale of 0–10), the repression information treatment substantially reduces individuals' support by 12%.

Heterogeneous effects by information sources. To provide further evidence for the information mechanism we

proposed, we examine the heterogeneous effects of information treatments among citizens who have different levels of information. If our information argument holds, the repression information treatment will have a smaller effect on individuals who are better informed about the SCS's repressive potential.

We use the sources where individuals obtain information about the SCS to construct a proxy for how informed they are. Individuals who obtain information from only state media outlets are considered less informed, while all other individuals are considered more informed. The reason is that Chinese state media rarely report negative news about the SCS, whereas other information sources such as social media and nonstate media outlets occasionally reveal the SCS's repressive potential. Thus, if an individual only obtains information from state media, her knowledge about the SCS's repressive potential will be very limited.¹³

We identify 180 less informed respondents and 557 more informed respondents, and then estimate equation (1) on these two subsamples. Figure 4 shows that the repression information treatment has a larger effect among less informed respondents. The findings suggest that information about repression poses a greater shock to less informed respondents, which provides further evidence for our information argument.

Discussion of the experimental findings

One may argue that citizens are probably aware of the SCS's repressive potential. They support the SCS because they underestimate the prevalence of government abuse. To challenge our findings further, one might also argue that the case of repressing online criticism in our treatment might make some of our subjects realize that the scope of SCS repression can be much broader in the real world: if a minor transgression like online criticism could be punished, the SCS would likely have been widely used to punish a variety of political actions, including more radical ones. But it should be noted that we use “often [经常] posting criticisms online to blemish the

11. We also include controls as robustness checks; see the discussion of the survey findings for more details. We use robust standard errors because treatments are randomized at the individual level. The results are similar when clustering on universities.

12. Note that the interaction effect between social order and repression is positive but statistically insignificant (λ in eq. [1]). This positive effect is likely due to the limitation of the field survey because we are unable to randomize the order of information regarding social order and repression on the paper-based survey questionnaire. Respondents in the joint treatment group always see the social order information before the repression information. Thus, the interaction and marginal effects of the social order information might be overestimated due to the presence of order-effect bias (Perreault 1975). In fact, we directly compare the social order information group (group 2) with the control group (group 1), and the effect is also statistically insignificant, but the effect of repression information is always negative and statistically significant.

13. Given its political sensitivity, we are unable to ask respondents direct factual questions about the SCS's repressive potential. The proxy we used has limitations, and one should interpret the heterogeneous effects with caution.




Figure 3. Information treatment effects, full sample. *Top*, main effects of the two treatments and their interaction effect. *Bottom*, marginal effects: main effects plus the interaction effect. Effective number of observations is 737. (Ten respondents did not answer the last page of the questionnaire; see app. sec. A.2.3 for a discussion of nonresponse.)

government’s image” in the treatment condition (app. sec. A.2.1). Unlike occasional criticism that many people might have done, frequent criticism is more like a radical action than a minor transgression. In addition, if this “online criticism” treatment reminds respondents of the prevalence of repression via the SCS, it will especially influence citizens who are more active in online criticism because they are the potential targets of such repression. In the survey, we asked the question, “Do you often publicly comment on or repost political events or trending news online?” We examine the heterogeneous effect of our “online criticism” treatment on active versus nonactive commentators and find little difference between these two groups. The evidence from this additional analysis suggests that issue prevalence is unlikely to be what drives the treatment effect. See appendix section B.1.4 for a more detailed discussion of this alternative mechanism.

Another explanation for the effect of the repression information treatment is that people may simply dislike repression. But if citizens’ distaste for repression were the only reason, we would not expect the repression information treatment to have a heterogeneous effect on individuals with different levels of information. As shown in figure 4, the repression information has a larger effect on less informed individuals. This suggests that citizens have limited information about the SCS’s repressive function, although we cannot completely rule out the distaste-for-repression mechanism.

We further control for a number of other variables that could influence citizens’ support for the SCS. As shown in table B.1, the results remain robust after controlling for social distrust, self-reported social rule violations, family income,

gender, age, and party membership. We use individuals’ support for government management of the SCS as an alternative measure for the outcome variable and find similar results (table B.2).

One concern with survey experiments is that the treatment effect could be a short-run priming effect: the treatment scenarios suddenly increase the accessibility of some matters in memory while ignoring others (Chong and Druckman 2007). But if priming were the main reason behind the treatment effects, we would have found that priming the SCS’s social-order-maintenance function increases people’s support. The finding that repression information decreases support but social-order-maintenance information does not increase support is consistent with the information mechanism we proposed, although we cannot fully rule out priming/framing effects. In the next section, we provide observational evidence for the long-term effects of information control on support for the SCS and broaden the scope of the experimental findings.

EVIDENCE FROM OBSERVATIONAL DATA

In this section, we further explore the role of information in citizens’ support for the SCS, by focusing on two channels: government information control and citizens’ tendency to isolate discredited peers. We use observational data from the field survey of college students and a nationwide online survey of over 2,000 Chinese netizens to broaden the scope of our experimental findings. We then conduct sentiment analysis on 646 SCS-related reports from state media outlets to show empirical support for a key assumption of our




Figure 4. Information treatment effects, by information source. Circles indicate the subsample of respondents obtaining SCS information from nonstate media (i.e., more informed; $N = 557$), while triangles represent the subsample of respondents obtaining SCS information from state media only (i.e., less informed; $N = 180$). *Top*, main effects of the two treatments and their interaction effect. *Bottom*, marginal effects: main effects plus the interaction effect.

theory; that is, state media very rarely, if at all, report the SCS in a negative way.

Two surveys and explanatory variables

In addition to the survey experiment, we asked a series of questions related to SCSs in the field survey of college students, which allow us to conduct observational studies. We further use a large-scale nationwide online survey with broader demographic representativeness to complement our field survey. The online survey was conducted between February and April 2018 through a non-China-based survey company. The sampling process of the online survey accounted for the distributions of age, gender, and region of China's internet-based population using recent statistics from the International Data Base of the US Census Bureau (2016), Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2015), and Statista (2016).¹⁴ See appendix section A.3 for details about this nationwide survey.

We are interested in whether citizens' support for the SCS is influenced by state information control (hypothesis 2). We fit ordinary least squares models with the two survey data sets to explore this relationship. We measure government information control as whether an individual obtains information about the SCS from state media because state media provide the most important channel through which the Chinese government conducts propaganda and thought work (Brady 2009). This question also partially captures government censorship because citizens who are exposed to censorship or conduct self-censorship are more likely to consume information from state media (Simonov and Rao 2018). In the field survey, we specifically ask whether respondents obtained information about the SCS from state media outlets, including state TV channels, newspapers, websites, and the public accounts of state media outlets on social media platforms. In the nationwide online survey, we asked individuals from which information sources they knew about the SCS, including TVs, newspapers, social media, commercials, and so on. We code TVs and newspapers as a proxy for state media because most TV channels and newspapers in China are state owned.¹⁵

Although not discussed in the theory section, citizens' tendency to avoid low-score peers could exacerbate their information problem and lead to support for the SCS. This is

because, as one stays away from low-credit peers, one will be less likely to question the reasons behind their low credits and hence less likely to know about the SCS's repressive potential. To measure respondents' tendency to avoid low-credit peers, we use the question, "Imagine a good friend of yours has a sudden drop in their social credit score. Would you start to look at him/her differently?" We did not directly ask whether they are willing to avoid the friend because such wording would induce preference falsification. This question was only asked in the nationwide online survey.

Several other factors could also influence support for the SCS. As discussed above, citizens in dictatorships want to improve social trust and contract enforcement. If they consider the SCS a tool to enforce social contracts, we should expect that individuals with lower interpersonal trust are more likely to support the SCS. Besides, individuals may be more likely to support the SCS if they obey social rules and contribute to social goods. Thus, we ask several questions to capture individuals' social conformity and social services in the field survey. Moreover, being a state employee or a Communist Party member may increase an individual's support for government policies. Thus, we control for these two variables. We also include other controls such as age, education level, gender, income, and urban residence.

Observational evidence on the causes of information problems

Government information control. Our theory suggests that people's support for the SCS is associated with government information control, especially the positive framing of the SCS in state media. Figure 5 provides initial evidence using data from the field survey. We standardize all variables to make coefficients comparable. As predicted, a 1 SD increase in respondents' reliance on state media for information about the SCS increases support by 0.22 SD, and the effect is statistically significant even after we control for a number of covariates. This strong positive effect provides evidence consistent with the theoretical argument.

Individuals may support SCSs if they conform to social norms and contribute to public goods. But conforming and well-behaved individuals may be more prone to state propaganda. We control for these two variables to address this concern. Figure 5 shows that the main effect of state media remains robust even if we control for social conformity and social service.

Figure 6 provides further evidence from the nationwide online survey data. It shows that citizens who knew the SCS from TV and newspapers are more likely to support it (by 0.07 SD). The magnitude is smaller than that of the field survey, likely because of the measure we used: we asked respondents

14. See the International Data Base of the US Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/idb.html>; Pew Global Attitudes Survey, <https://www.pewresearch.org/methodology/international-survey-research/international-methodology/global-attitudes-survey/china/2015>; Statista, <https://www.statista.com> (accessed August 11, 2022).

15. This question is conditional on respondents reporting the use of commercial SCSs (e.g., Tencent or Sesame SCSs). There are 1,469 commercial-SCS users out of the total 2,027 respondents. For the main analysis, we code nonusers into the non-state-media group. In app. sec. B.3.2, we show that the results are robust when using commercial-SCS users only.




Figure 5. Sources of support for SCSs: field survey of college students. University fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered on universities. Effective number of observations is 665.

where they obtained the information about commercial SCSs (e.g., Tencent or Sesame SCSs) instead of state-run SCSs. Additionally, we use TV and newspapers as a proxy for state media. Nevertheless, the statistical significance suggests that government information control is an important reason behind public support for the SCS in China.

Tendency to avoid low-score peers. An interesting finding is a positive relationship between individuals’ changing attitude toward friends with bad credits and support for the SCS (fig. 6). Figure 7 shows that, among 2,028 respondents, 62% of them will either look at the friend differently or hesitate to hold a positive attitude. Figure 6 shows that a 1 SD increase in this measure increases support for SCSs by 0.18 SD, and the effect is statistically significant.

Several factors would explain this relationship. First, more credulous individuals may be more likely to stay away from low-score peers and support the SCS. To capture credulity, we control for individuals’ opinions about the fairness of social credit scores because more credulous individuals will be more likely to consider social credit scores fair. Second, individuals’ risk preferences could explain the relationship between their tendency to avoid discredited friends and support for the SCS. Risk preference is the propensity to engage in behavior with the potential for loss or harm. Risk-averse individuals may be more willing to stay away from low-score peers and, meanwhile, care more about safety and hence support the SCS. We include a variable based on the question: “Have you ever decided to not use a website or app because you did not want to share personal information?” This privacy-related question

captures individuals’ propensity to take risks. However, we find that the relationship between avoiding friends with bad credits and support for the SCS remains strongly positive and statistically significant even after controlling for these two variables (cols. 2 and 3 in table B.5).

A social-scoring system discourages citizens from interacting with low-score individuals because bad social credits signal untrustworthiness, and people have a natural tendency to avoid harm. Thus, when encountering a low-credit individual, citizens naturally stay away from her without questioning whether her score was reduced for political or nonpolitical reasons. When a social rating system lumps citizens’ dissenting acts and other behavior together under a unified score of trustworthiness, social sanctions against discredited citizens make it difficult to uncover political repression behind people’s low scores. In China, millions of discredited citizens are blacklisted on websites, on billboards in public spaces, in social media apps, or even through their phone ringtones. Although a majority of the cases include reasons of punishment (e.g., unpaid debts), many cases are listed without specific reasons.¹⁶ Besides, it is not unusual for the government to use nonpolitical reasons as disguises for political repression, as illustrated by the recent persecution of Ren Zhiqiang (see Buckley 2020). Thus, people with a higher tendency to avoid low-score peers are more supportive of the SCS probably because they are less likely to notice repression under the SCS. But one should interpret this relationship with caution because of the indirect measure.

16. See, e.g., “2018 Feicheng Court’s List of the Twelfth Batch of Untrustworthy Persons Subject to Enforcement,” at https://www.sohu.com/a/242856352_687296 (accessed October 21, 2021).




Figure 6. Sources of support for SCSs: nationwide online survey. Region fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered on provinces. Effective number of observations is 1,895.

Social distrust. It is also worthwhile to mention the relationship between social distrust and support for the SCS. As shown in both surveys, social distrust is positively associated with support for the SCS. The field survey shows a smaller effect because we asked a more specific question about social distrust: to what extent respondents believe that people take advantage of each other and violate social rules. Nevertheless, the results imply that citizens with lower trust support the SCS more because they believe this tool can promote trustworthiness in society.

Discussion of the survey findings

Social desirability bias poses a particular challenge to the study of the SCS because it might be socially desirable to consume state media, sanction discredited peers, and, meanwhile, support the SCS. To mitigate the potential influence of social desirability bias, we control for respondents' self-evaluation of social credits. The logic is that individuals with stronger social desirability bias will be more likely to rate themselves higher than the average. Column 2 in table B.4 and column 4 in table B.5 show that our main findings are robust when self-evaluation of social credits are controlled for.

Another concern is that the relationship between state media exposure and support for the SCS could be due to some unobserved personal traits. For example, obedient, insecure, and risk-averse citizens are more likely to consume state media and support the SCS. In the field survey, we ask respondents how often they comment on or repost political events or breaking news on the internet. We control for this variable to account for individuals' risk preferences. Individuals' obedience can be measured by their willingness to petition an unfair

policy proposed by the university authority. To capture insecurity, we asked respondents to what extent they believe others will take advantage of them when the occasion presents itself. Table B.4 shows that the effect of state media exposure is statistically significant even we control for these three variables.

In the nationwide online survey, we use citizens' reliance on TV and newspapers for information about the SCS to proxy government information control because most TV channels and newspapers are state owned in China. However, it should be noted that the relationship between knowing the SCS from




Figure 7. Attitude toward friends with bad credits

state media and support for the SCS is not causally identified. Citizens may self-select into consuming state media. Since education, living in an SCS pilot city, and Communist Party membership are important predictors of using state media for information about the SCS, we control for these variables, along with other individual characteristics, to address the self-selection problem.¹⁷ In addition, the impact of state media could be more than just a lack of information or censorship. In the theoretical section of the article, we discuss the possibility of both censorship and propaganda (framing) effects. Although we cannot distinguish these two types of effect in the nationwide online survey, the experimental findings from the field survey are consistent with our information argument. The experiment design also addresses the causal identification problem. Thus, it is the combination of both experimental and observational evidence that supports our argument about the role of information control in public support for the SCS in China.

Evidence from state media text

We argue that citizens lack information about the SCS's repressive potential partly because of the government's positive framing. To provide evidence that Chinese state media frame the SCS in a positive way and play down its negative aspects, we collect scripts of TV news reports and newspaper articles that contain "social credit" in the title or text from the CCTV News Report, the *People's Daily*, and the *Global Times*. The CCTV News Report, or *Xinwen Lianbo*, is China's most watched television news program, a nightly broadcast at 7:00 p.m. that typically lasts for 30 minutes with an average viewership of 240 billion per day. The *People's Daily* is the largest newspaper group in China. The paper is an official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, published worldwide with a circulation of 3 million. The *People's Daily* and CCTV News Report are the two most official outlets of state media in China. The *Global Times* is under the auspices of the *People's Daily*, but it often publicizes information that is considered inappropriate to be included in the *People's Daily* and CCTV News. Thus, these three sources convey the most important voices of the Chinese government.

We obtain 50 CCTV news reports (data from 2003 to 2018), 410 articles from People.cn (the online platform of *People's Daily*), and 186 articles from the *Global Times*. We use human-coded sentiment analysis to identify the tone of the articles (table 2). We find that only 2.8% of articles are negative. The rest of the articles either praise the SCS's trust-building and social-order-maintenance functions (positive) or simply pre-

Table 2. Human-Coded Sentiment Analysis

	CCTV	<i>People's Daily</i>	<i>Global Times</i>	Total	Percentage
Positive	20	239	114	373	57.7
Negative	0	10	8	18	2.8
Neutral	30	161	64	255	39.5
Total	50	410	186	646	

sent facts about the SCS to the general public (neutral). Among the 16 negative articles (excluding 2 identical articles reported by different outlets), 11 articles express concerns over local governments' overdoing of SCSs' social-order-maintenance function (e.g., punishing jaywalking, unpaid parking fees, and frequent job turnovers), 3 articles raise privacy concerns, 1 article mentions the lack of remedies for people in social credit blacklists, and 1 *Global Times* article actually defends the SCS against Western criticism. Among the 11 articles concerning local governments' overdoing of SCSs, only 1 article mentioned a phrase "credit deduction for illegal petitioning [闹访、缠访扣分]" that is related to political repression. This phrase is barely noticeable, as the article mainly talks about local governments' overdoing of SCSs' social-order-maintenance function.

The evidence supports our assumption that Chinese state media discuss SCSs in a very positive way and avoid revealing their political repression function. Even in the 2.8% of articles in which a negative tone can be detected, strictly speaking, only one article has one sentence that can be related to political repression.

CONCLUSION

China's SCS was created to enforce contracts and maintain social order, but it has great potential for political repression given the huge amount of citizen information it integrates and the ease with which it punishes violators by lowering their "social credits." This article argues that public support for the SCS is partly due to citizens' lack of information concerning the SCS's repressive potential. This information problem is caused by the milder, less visible repression that the SCS entails and is exacerbated by government information control in dictatorships. Using a field survey experiment, we show that respondents are not more supportive of the SCS when receiving information about its order-maintenance role but largely decrease their support when knowing its repressive function. Using observational data from the same field survey and a nationwide online survey, we find that citizens are more likely to support the SCS when their knowledge about it is from state media outlets. We further conduct text analysis of state media reports

17. We find that citizens with higher education, Communist Party membership, or living in pilot cities are more likely to know the SCS from state media (app. sec. B.3.1).

and show that the government portrays the SCS in a very positive way, with little mention of its repressive function. The evidence together highlights the role of information control in public support for the SCS in China.

The theory and findings have important implications for digital surveillance. They suggest that the government can hide the repressive potential of digital surveillance under its security-maintenance function to garner public support. This problem is more serious in dictatorships, not only because of government propaganda and censorship but also because citizens in societies with underdeveloped legal systems crave better enforcement of social contracts, and a centralized information collection and enforcement platform like the SCS in China meets the demand. Nevertheless, an important takeaway from this article is that public support for digital surveillance is not very stable in dictatorships.¹⁸ As we illustrated in the field survey experiment, a simple reminder of the SCS's repressive function can substantially reduce citizens' support. It is not easy for the government to recover the reduced support by showing the social benefits of digital surveillance because citizens have already been overwhelmed by the government's positive framing. Although potential backlash from citizens may not stop the government from expanding surveillance and repression, it imposes some costs on the government. Citizens' awareness of repression may also lead to preference falsification (Kuran 1991), rendering state surveillance ineffective. Thus, rational dictators would have an incentive to keep the level of repression low in order to maintain a well-functioning surveillance state.

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18. For example, Suzhou City developed a Civility Code to punish minor offenses such as garbage sorting, dining habits, and jaywalking. The local government received pushback from the public for its overreach and soon took down the system. See "A Chinese City Withdraws 'Civility Code' Following Online Criticism," at <https://advox.globalvoices.org/2020/09/14/a-chinese-city-withdraws-civility-code-following-online-criticism/> (accessed October 21, 2021).

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