I just had a hypothetical idea to reduce the scam risk of direct deals/private onions. The multisig most markets use is 2/3: the funds are released to the vendor after two of the three parties approve the transaction.
I propose instead a 2/2 multisig, but with a twist. To prevent buyers from never releasing the funds to the vendor, the buyer pays a small "collateral" in addition to the transaction amount, which is released back to the buyer whenever the rest is released to the vendor. The collateral could be agreed upon ahead of time, and should be large enough that the buyer is incentivised to actually release the funds, but small enough that a scamming vendor could not effectively use the collateral to convince the buyer to release the funds despite having been scammed. I would guess 10% to be a decent amount, though this could vary depending on the transaction value. This buyer collateral would highly disincentivize buyer scamming, since it is in the buyer's best interest to get back the collateral.
To disincentivize vendor scamming, there would also be a vendor collateral, presumably of a comparable amount to the buyer collateral, which the vendor pays at the start of the transaction and is released back to the vendor along with the funds once both parties sign. This would discourage vendors from scamming since they would lose money doing so (the vengeful buyer would be unlikely to release the funds just to get back a small collateral).
I think this model would be very effective, since with this it is in the best interest of buyer and seller alike to do an honest transaction. If there is a problem, both parties lose, since all the funds end up in limbo.
What do you guys think? Would this be possible to implement? It seems like a pretty small modification to existing multisig technology, and would make DDs a lot safer (and greatly reduce our dependence on markets).
This is called insurance. I've been kicking around how to create an anti-scamming insurance in my head for a few years now. The issue with this idea is there is no, "neutral" 3rd party. So in the event of a dispute, the vendor has no recourse, assuming they have done the right thing, so why would a vendor engage in this transaction? You'd also have the problem of buyers never finalizing, as far as they are concerned, the btc is spent. I hear you that the 'collateral' should solve this issue, but in the event of a dispute, the buyer just won't release anything.
The nut to crack is a trusted third party in an inherently trustless marketplace.